



**STRATEGY
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**LOGISTICS CHALLENGES IN SUPPORT
OF OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA (OOTW)**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The Bosnia logistics story has been told in bits and pieces since the United States Military deployed in support of the region. There have been numerous good new articles published in journals and magazines covering the outstanding jobs United States (US) logistic soldiers and civilians are doing to support forces in Bosnia. However, as the first CONUS based battalion size unit to assume the regions logistic mission, the Regimental Support Squadron (RSS), 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) would conduct logistics business totally different from previous logistic units. The ability to conduct materiel management in the theater would be the overarching factor in the RSS's ability fix logistic for the first time in history of operation in Bosnia. This document will provide an up close observation of the logistic challenges the RSS encountered as the first CONUS logistic unit with the capability to provide materiel management in the theater. The thesis of this document will cover the training in preparation for the mission and the full spectrum of logistic support provided in the theater.

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LOGISTIC CHALLENGES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA (OOTW)

The Army decided to use the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract in December 1995 to augment (not replace) its forces that were part of the Bosnian peacekeeping mission. The United States provides a major portion of the mission's implementing force as set forth in the Dayton Peace Accords and occupies key leadership positions responsible for the mission. The U.S. Army Europe provides most of the U.S. force and is the major command responsible for the mission's logistics planning and funding. To date, approximately, 16,200 U.S. soldiers have been deployed to support the Bosnia region.¹

The U.S. Army Europe used LOGCAP to provide a range of logistics and engineering services including troop housing and facilities, food service, laundry operation, base camp equipment maintenance, shuttle bus services with camps, and cargo handling services throughout the area of operation.² From the beginning the Bosnia mission rotated between 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions, both USEUROPE units for approximately two years. Both Divisions would deploy a Forward Support Battalion (plus) to support its logistic efforts. A Forward Support Battalion was just not large enough and capable of supporting the logistic magnitude of the Bosnia mission without maximum augmentation. The planning process to determine the manpower requirements to meet the mission would have to be considerable. Most importantly, it would have to be conducted for each logistics unit assuming the Bosnia mission. In most cases, no two units possess the same logistic capability. At minimum, the logistic planners should have considered the following questions:

1. What planning process will be used to determine the logistic support requirements in support of the mission?
2. What process or method will be used to determine the augmentation requirements to support the mission?
3. What is the duration of the mission?
4. Was doctrine is available to facilitate or support the selected process?

The above questions would become important considerations during the Regimental Support Squadron (RSS) rotation. The planning process should have identified the capabilities of the RSS versus a Forward Support Battalion (FSB). Poor planning and communication would result in mission redundancy and duplication of effort in almost every area of the RSS mission.

October 1997, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Guard. The Regiment would be the first CONUS based unit of its size and logistical capability to deploy in support of operation in the region.

The RSS mission was: The 2nd ACR Support Squadron (FWD) will provide continuous Combat and Health Service Support to Units assigned or attached to the 2nd ACR (FWD) as a member of the Stabilization Force of "Operation Joint Endeavor" in the former Republic of Yugoslavia³

The 2nd ACR is a XVIII Airborne Corps separate brigade with a mission that would require it to be attached to the 1st Armored Division (EUROPE) in support of Operation Joint Guard. The lack of logistics ownership, direction, and guidance provided would cause the RSS logistic planners to struggle in the early phases of preparation. The RSS logistics planners would encounter numerous difficulties planning for and preparing to assume the mission of providing logistic support to the Bosnia Theater. The deployment would reveal a substantial number of shortcomings in the way the United States (US) Military plan for and conduct logistics in support of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Without logistic guidance and direction from XVIII Airborne Corps, 1st Armored Division, or USAEUR, the RSS logistic mission requirement would be only the result of the staff's reconnaissance efforts. The concept of support and troop to task list requirements were derived from analyzing what it would take for the RSS to accomplish the Bosnia Operational Area logistic mission.

THE PLANNING PROCESS:

I (LTC Willie C. Jordan) assumed command of the RSS on June 6, 1997. During the continuing planning process I garnered the impression that the Regiment was on its own. When I arrived, it was brought to my attention that the RSS logician's reconnaissance right seat ride allocations had been reduced. The gist of the planning guidance I received initially from the Regiment was "Plan to take everything. We are going on a peacekeeping mission and we are worst casing it right now, so plan like the situation could go bad and we have actually enforced the peace".⁴

The Regimental Commanders' perspective and guidance called for the regiment to be ready to go to war from anywhere in the world stationed directly from Bosnia. This perspective would require the regiment to deploy with its organic equipment. The Regimental commander believed having the regiment organic alone would ensure the regiment was relevant to the army even during operations in Bosnia. To maintain METL proficiency the regiment would require its organic equipment for training. The Marine Regimental Combat Team (RCT) brings a combat capability, and a combined arms team in totally, without the overhead of a division. The regiment has unique logistic capabilities. The unique capability of the RSS made it a perfect logistic match in support of the Bosnia Operational Area. The decision to deploy the regiment's organic equipment would almost become a logistic "bridge too far".⁵

After the RSS staff returned from its reconnaissance trip (mid June) the guidance became somewhat more realistic, but not that much better. Basically, we did a requirement versus capabilities assessment to support the mission. During my reconnaissance, I identified three logistics strategic centers of gravity's that could become showstoppers for the mission. The first logistic center of gravity I identified was the RSS inability to process supplies in preparation for distribution. We created from the Supply Support Activity (SSA) a Theater Distribution Center (TDC). While the concept of a TDC had never been implemented at the brigade level, I believed it was the only way a SSA the size of RSS could accommodate the volume of supplies being sent to Bosnia through a consolidated warehouse. The second logistic center of gravity identified was the theater transportation hub. Because of the distance to the base camps and the safety concerns on the routes to camps, support to camps would become the RSS's first center of gravity. The third center of gravity was the Forward Area Support Team (FAST) capability. Under the FAST concept, every logistics effort provided to the base camps would be conducted through the FAST. The FAST Commander was responsible for providing direct support maintenance, medical and supply support to the base camps. The FAST Commander was also accountable for the whole requisitioning and receipt process. More importantly, they were the liaison between the RSS and the units. The bottom line, to the FAST Commander was the RSS forward.⁶

After the FAST requirements were determined and team members assigned to the FAST to begin training, the staff worked out the logistic requirement needed to support Guardian Base. The only thing left was for the staff to work out the support requirements for Eagle Base, back up DS to the FASTs, and required support to support distribution management. After we defined the requirements, we assigned capabilities. The RSS came away from the planning process with two documents the Concept of Support and the Troop to Task List.

TRAINING IN PREPARATION FOR THE MISSION:

The Regiment's training requirements in preparation for operations in Bosnia consisted of Rules of Engagement (ROE) training and a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE). The Regiment's training period was well planned and intense because of time remaining before deployment. A team from the HQ XVI II Airborne Corps conducted the ROE training. The quality of the training was impressive. The attention and support provided in support of the Regiment's ROE training would permeate the entire unit.

The ROE training conveyed the importance of discipline, self-control, and order in the execution of this kind of mission. The ROE team made the training relevant to the situation in

Bosnia. As the Senior Logistician and Commander of Guardian Base, I am forever indebted to the ROE team for their professionalism and comment during early the days of our training.

Being stationed at Fort Polk provided the Regiment with an excellent training opportunity. We would be the first unit to participate in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The only problem encountered in preparations for MRE training was the lack of experience on the part of JRTC. After the RSS staff returned from their reconnaissance trip in Bosnia, they had to write up the logistic training requirement for JRTC in support of the MRE.

Nothing did more to prepare the Regiment to assume the mission in Bosnia than the MRE. Through the MRE, the RSS learned exactly what the FAST teams' leaders were required to do to support the base camps. After working out the logistic showstoppers, TTPs were developed on material receipt and retrograde procedures to keep track of what was ordered and what was shipped. Good material accountability from Guardian Base to the base camps would stop the logistic finger pointing so common in previous rotations. The MRE also conveyed the importance and magnitude required conducting convoy management in support of area distribution. The procedures would require each convoy commander to receive a TOC situation awareness briefing before departing Guardian Base and the surrounding base camps. The location base camps commanders, depending on the threat situation, approved convoy redeployment.⁷

Some important lessons learned happened to the FAST teams that deployed early with the squadrons that support the elections. As creatures of habit, the FAST teams fell into the 1st Infantry Division's Mission Support Teams (MST) routine of support. By the time the RSS and the Regiment arrived, there was animosity over logistic support within the base camp logistic leaders. The squadrons were comfortable with the logistics plan and concept of support worked out during the MRE. This could have been prevented by deploying the Support Operations Officer (SOP) to implement and monitor the concept of support the Regiment train and refined during the MRE. The FAST continued to be the theater lifeline for logistic support between Guardian base and the base camps throughout the duration of the deployment. Any support provided to soldiers in Bosnia required it to be processed through the FAST.

MATERIEL MANGEMENT CENTER & SUPPLY SUPPORT OPERATION

As mentioned previously, the RSS is a large, versatile and capable organization. It is uniquely different from all other logistic battalions (FSB and MSB) in the army. The RSS has organic to the unit its own Regimental Materiel Management Center (RMMC). In simple terms,

the RMMC is the logistical brain of the organization. The RMMC is organized with functional managers for class II, IV, VI, water and I; class III; class V; class VII (property book); class IX and maintenance. The mission of the RMMC is (the same as a Division Materiel Management Center) to anticipate requirements, then assure that resources are available and pushed or delivered forward to the right place at the right time.

JRTC' inability to replicate the RMMC training during the MRE would have extreme consequences during actual mission support in Bosnia. As a result, the RSS would not anticipate or experience the pain associated with being the first and only logistical unit to conduct materiel management for itself in the theater. The RSS would waste a considerable amount of time and resources answering the mail to USAEUR, V Corps MMC on some very sensitive and embracing materiel management issues.

During my reconnaissance trip, I was amazed at the poor standards of logistic management being practiced in the theater. My first observation was of the Supply Support Activity (SSA). I noticed it had a substantial backlog of materials in constant supply to process. I was even more surprised when I observed the SSA processing twenty-five MILVANS of supplies through the warehouse and eighteen MILVANS kicked out as excess. Without question, the warehouse simply repacked the excess supplies in MILVANS and retrograded them back to Central Region. This observation was so extreme; it is almost impossible to visualize the readiness implication to the Theater. I returned from the recon trip with following logistic conclusions:

1. Materiel Management in support of the Bosnia Theater could not be conducted from central Region with any success. The volume of supplies shipped to Bosnia would require intensive management. The level of logistic management, a Support Operations (SPO) Section, was not capable of providing.

2. The SSA needed to be restructured to accommodate the volume of materials and supplies expected to be processed through the consolidated SSA.

3. The RSS needed to design management tools that would keep all logistic echelon associated with the theater abreast of RSS activities. The previous unit conducted a daily maintenance meeting. The RSS would conduct BI-weekly Material Readiness Review (MRR). This would allow the exchange of information on all classes of supply. The MRR would be a tremendous success in the RSS ability fix logistic problems. It also put a name with a responsible face on each base camp, namely the Battalion Executive Officer (XO) and Battalion Motor Officer. The next management tool design was a Weekly Update. The Weekly Updates would allow logistic information to flow and provide a platform for units to address their logistic

issues and concerns. The updates would later become the theater logistic audit trail. The Weekly updates stopped a lot of political finger pointing from Central Region. (The following e-mails is an example of the kind of materiel issues the RSS would be confronted with throughout the rotation:)

From: LTC WILLIE C. JORDAN (MTP:
RSS□CDR@flyaway.isenet2.readado.com)

Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 1997 22:26

To: XX)OOOCXXXXXXXXXX

Subject: RE: Weekly Update: Week ending 5 Dec 97

Sir

We did not know the magnitude of the problem unit until we received the letter from Mr. SARSS of Central Region (subject name). We knew the computer had problems and we identified the long close out time to 1St ID. We thought this was a small problem and we could fix the problem ourselves after the Transfer of Authority (TOA). Also, during the TOA we got DCL from Ft. Lee to come over and clean up what we thought was the computer's problems. However, we did not recognize that these problems have been growing for two years. In addition, we did not know and had no way of knowing that the software files that were congressionally mandated had been removed. This software is what ensures your audit trail on the computer; currently there is no check and balance in the system for sensitive items (i.e.. small arms parts). We learned the hard way that this issue is highly political and sensitive. The information paper published by Mr. Oldaker implied that we were the cause of the problems in Bosnia. This not true. The bottom line: Our system dose not allow us maxim productive to accomplish our mission. We have received a lot of assistance. However, the system is still broke. Presently, COL XXXXXX is working this issue. I saw the message he sent COL XXXXXXCX, PEO SARSS. My concern is if we do not take action to fix this sensitive file problem, then we are part of the problem and just as guilty as whatever is hiding in those files. We could take the easy wrong like everyone else; I prefer to take the hard right.

Sir, I am not sure how the money is working in CR to account for retrograde from BH. Presently, TFE G4 and comptroller have several financial meeting scheduled. I believe this is one of the main topics of discussion. I do want to make clear that we do not have any visibility over our material credits. Sir, I don't think we should go back to manual procedure and the tent was a better deal.
WILL⁸

There would be numerous materiel management issues with Central Region during the RSS rotation. The following is an abstract from a 14 November Weekly Update. The issues

discussed in this Weekly Update captures the essences of logistic and materiel management problems the RSS would have to answer:

ASL MANAGEMENT: Questions regarding ASL management have been a hot issue this week. All questions are covered in the discussions below. Bottom line: we have 2,623 lines at Guardian where as 1 ID had 3,216 lines and our zero balance has dropped from 44% to 37% in the last 30 days. None of the comments below are intended to slight any activity or operation conducted prior to our arrival. The purpose of the discussions below is to inform everyone where we stand with the management of consolidated warehouse operations in this theater. The regiment has admittedly brought a much more robust management activity into the theater than what previously existed. This enables us to focus solely on this theater since we have no other major areas of concern (i.e., home station management is handled by installation DOL).

ISSUE #1 Increasing of Requisition Objectives (RO) for Major Assemblies: We carry 53 lines of Major Assemblies. The dollar value on the books when we accepted the ASL was \$2,892,961. We increased the RO on 42 of these lines in order to pick up accountability of Major Assemblies found on the camp during the inventory or which were retrograded to Guardian from outlying base camps during the transition. Only three lines were increased beyond what was here. These three lines are all readiness drivers for HMMWV's and the increase is justified based on previous experience within the 2nd ACR. We decreased RO's on three lines for the M1A1 fleet. The new equipment density did not justify the need to keep such high RO's on these three lines. After the above changes the 53 lines of Major Assemblies are valued at \$11,514,945. The majority of the delta (\$8,621,984) is simply due to picking up accountability for that which was already on the ground.

ISSUE #2 To what extent was the ASL affected by the large volume of excess property discovered during the transition. Most of the excess seen at Eagle and Guardian during the transition was class IX and was not on the ASL. Since they were not on the ASL, there was no Requisition Objective in the system for these lines. Turning them in will not generate any replenishment requisitions and thus there is no overall affect on the ASL. We have performed a close scrub of the excess lines we picked up at Guardian and continue to scrub the Eagle Base lines. So far at Eagle we have cut only 12 lines but we anticipate as many as 1000 lines will be cut. Estimate 12th will complete this scrub by 15 November. At Guardian we have scrubbed the 1, 724 lines of excess and retrograded items found here during the transition. 165 of these lines are associated with readiness drivers and will become a part of our ASL.

ISSUE #3 Were there any ASL lines, which had a Requisition Objectives of zero, and what actions did we taken to avoid excessing these out of theater if they are readiness drivers? We found 10 lines (all Major Assemblies), which had an RO of zero when we assumed responsibility. We increased the RO on these lines to match what was on the ground. This in effect avoided having these Major Assemblies excessed out of theater. In addition there were 1, 724 lines of retrograded Class IX excess found here during the transition. Over the last four weeks of processing these excess lines we found 165 lines connected to

readiness drivers and added them to the ASL with an RO of what was on hand. Similar actions are on going at Eagle.

ISSUE #4 What percent of our 44% zero balance is caught up in bad requisitions that can not be fixed and what impact has that had on increasing the RO's in order to support the fleet? We are still in the process of determining how much of our zero balance is caused by bad requisitions. We know of 2,642 bad activity records in the SARSS-1 files that we inherited. The MMC supply section is going through these records to determine what action to take. We have also reviewed the 116 lines of ASL which is zero balance. We increased the RO's on 725 of these lines. The RO on these 725 lines ranged from 1 to 3 and the Due Outs exceeded the RO in every case. We decided to increase the RO's on these lines using the following formula; $RO = \text{Due outs} + 3$. This will enable us to meet current demands and build up a reasonable stockage level. Since implementing these changes our Zero Balance percentage has dropped to 36% and only 23% zero balance with due outs. So we are obviously beginning to stock what the customer demands and we expect these percentages to continue to drop as the supply system catches up to the changes.

ISSUE #5 What affect did the change in fleets have on right sizing of the ASLs at Guardian & Eagle? Eagle Base SSA did not right size. We started from scratch using 889 lines that H Co. 159 brought from Polk and the 116 lines 151 AD brought. Currently Eagle has picked up 2,873 lines of supplies found lying around. We set the RO= the quantity on the ground. This gives the Eagle ASL 3,878 lines. We are not finished reviewing the excess lines picked up. Thus far we have deleted 12 lines and identified 3 lines that need to move to Guardian Base. Current estimate is that 12th will complete this scrub by 15 Nov.97. Right sizing of the Guardian Base

ASL went through the following process. The 151 ID Guardian Base ASL had a total of 3,216 lines in July of which only 2.8% matched our ASL from Fort Polk. Thus, we brought 226 lines from Fort Polk to support 2nd ACR units. These were added to the Guardian Base ASL with the RO's equal to what we brought. Additions since are; 59 lines for the towed howitzer fleet, 20 lines of Vehicle mounted TOW peculiar lines, 7 lines for the CLIV program, 32 lines for the battery program, 31 lines SSSC, 68 lines considered critical to the XM114's 37 lines of Class III (P) These in addition to the additional talked about in the previous paragraphs brings the Guardian Base ASL to 2,623 lines. This is 593 lines less than the 1st ID had here in July.

ISSUE # 6 What are the facts attributing to the big increase in Corps ROs for SFOR2? The greatest part of this answer is covered in previous paragraphs. Although we are not aware of the specific issues related to this question, obviously if you begin adding lines to the ASLs and start picking up excess items found on the base camps; in order to avoid having the parts excessed out of the theater, your ROs will have to be significantly increased. The adjustments we made for Major Assemblies alone increased the Corps values by \$8,621,984 and all we did was account for what was on the ground. You must realize that the addition of Front Polk lines would also have increased the Corps RO value. Again these stocks were brought with us from Polk and we simply accounted for them here in theater but their value is now part of the SFOR2 RO value. There

are also the 1724 lines of retrograded excess we have had to deal with over the last four weeks. 165 of these lines we determined to be mission critical and added them with an RO equal to what was already here on the ground. The value of these assets would also increase the value of the Corps SFOR2 ROs. Finally, we adjusted RO's of 725 of the 1116 lines of zero balance with due outs. The methodology is discussed in ISSUE #4 above. Values for the other additions are; towed Howitzer additions, 59 lines worth \$528,306 and Vehicle mounted TOW, 20 lines worth \$284,527. IFTE and Avenger ASL. Task Force Eagle has 24 Avenger systems. We added 29 lines off of the IFTE Mandatory Parts List (MPL) listing to support Avenger. In addition 47 lines of Avenger ASL were added for a combined value of \$1,374,425. This appears high but the ability to repair some of these high dollar items will be recouped during our nine-month stay. For example in the last 12 months in the regiment 32 items have broken on the 2n ACR Avengers. Replacement cost for these items was \$725,225. The repair cost using the IFTE would have been \$15,200. This is a capital investment, which pays. WE have received no inquiry from Corps G-4 or Corps Materiel Management Center regarding the adjustments in the SFOR2 RO value.

ISSUE #7 When will we be positioned to conduct the ASL demand analysis and ASL review board? We plan on conducting an ASL review board in January 1998. To perform a demand analysis prior to that date would not allow SFOR2 enough time to generate any demands, which could affect the ASL. WE would still be reacting to SFOR1 demands. We are however, performing common sense review of the ASL's and continually adjusting items that are not Readiness Drivers (i.e., Camouflage spreaders and poles, MKT burner parts, etc.,)

If materiel management is not performed in the theater of operation, there will be no limit to the waste of resources (both materials and manpower) in support of the Bosnia mission. The impacts will be visible in every aspect of logistics.

LOGISTICS CIVILIAN AUGMENTATION PROGRAM (LOGCAP)

No one can question the contributions LOGCAP has made across the full spectrum of military contingency operation in Bosnia. Marilyn Harris, a Department of the Army Civilian hit the mark in her June 2000 Strategy Research Project Paper Titled: LOGCAP: The Nation's Premier Contingency Contracting Program for Force XXI:

Commanders are concerned with protecting their center of gravity, and logistics is always a potential center of gravity. One great concern when this contract was awarded was whether it would become a replacement for the force. The Army clearly stated its purpose when awarding the contract that it was to be an augmentation to the force structure, a force multiplier, but not a replacement. Next came the inevitable cultural denial and the historical disconnects between government and contractor. Once tested and found to be good, some commanders overindulged in what the contractor brought to the table. To some observers, these were "growing pains;" to others, it was a bit more serious. Without adequate planning and

communication, the Army and other government agencies could inadvertently require the contractor to perform service outside the scope of the contract. In a contingency operation environment like Bosnia, this easily resulted in significant cost overruns, the type that the attention of Government Accounting Office (GAO), Army Audit Agency (AAA), the Inspector General and Congress. The image of the LOGCAP contractor ran the gamut from "money grubbing profiteer" to invaluable resource. Nevertheless, the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) became enamored of BRSC's performance. So much so that when the follow on, less expensive contract was awarded to DynCorp, USAREUR severed ties with the prescribed Department of the Army (DA) LOGCAP contract in favor of a more expensive, more restrictive, but already in place sole source contract with BRSC. However, it is important to recognize that the commanders tested contractors on the battlefield and found them to be very good.⁹

However, as the commander of the RSS responsible for providing logistics support to American forces assigned or attached to the 1st Armored Division; I have mixed emotions concerning the plan and resource determination requirements to support Operation Bosnia. The planners responsible for determining mission requirements did not consider or was not aware of the logistic capabilities of a Regimental Support Squadron. Either, the RSS should have been directed to reduce the assets it deployed with or the Brown and Root contracts should have been modified to accommodate the differences. As a result, mission redundancy and duplication of effort was commonplace during the RSS rotation.

TRANSPORTATION DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

During the mission analysis, the RSS identified unit distribution as one of its logistic Center of gravity in support of the mission. It was also identified as the first great example of duplication and waste of resource of the theater distribution, transportation assets. The theater distribution transportation system was the sole source method of providing supplies and evacuating and retrograding to all base camps in region. The RSS had organic to the organization a transportation platoon more than capable of supporting the mission. The RSS deployed with the appropriate manpower and equipment to support the theater transportation mission. Nevertheless, the 1454th Transportation Company ARNG out of North Carolina was mobilized (with the equipment and soldier) and attached to the RSS to provide transportation support. Plus, Brown and Root Service Contract (BRSC) had a large transportation section that would eventually assume the mission. The transportation duplication would also become a major readiness issue. Because of safety concerns in the region, units were directed to use the Up Armored HMMWV and PLS fleet. The organic transportation assets that both the 1445th and

RSS deployed with was never used. The organic equipment still had to be maintained to 10/20 standards. Having to maintain two fleets with already limited resources was a logistic and management nightmare.¹⁰

How can duplication of effort of this magnitude occur when LOGCAP is designed to augment organic CS/CSS capabilities? Planning has been cited again and again as key factors in the Army's inability to properly use contracting support on the battlefield to augment organic CS/CSS capabilities, not replace. The General Accounting Office (GAO) review of LOGCAP sited transportation cost increased from \$9.8 million to \$ 48 millions during 1996.¹¹

MAINTENANCE:

The poor planning of transportation assets would have a domino effect on the theater's maintenance and maintenance management resources. Trying to maintain two fleets would be an impossible task for the RSS without augmentation. While this duplication should have not occurred, here we experienced a perfect application for LOGCAP augmentation. Under LOGCAP conditions, this augmentation would mean a modification to the original contract. Meaning, the cost for this service would be considerable. A message sent to all Commanders early in the rotation captures the magnitude of the duplication:

Subject: Base Camp Densities captures the seriousness of the problem:

As the Senior Logistician and Keeper of the LOGSTAR, it is imperative that the RSS get an accurate density list of the systems currently in Bosnia. The LOGSTAR is presently getting a lot of attention up to DA level. The RSS is getting question from a multitude of sources and we need your assistance in verifying the equipment on hand and the equipment used in the execution of your Bosnia mission. It was imperative for the RSS to get an immediate count of both organic (equipment the unit deployed with) and drawled equipment to work the requirements and facilitate a BRSC personnel augmentation to meet the maintenance mission requirements. Because of poor planning guidance received from Higher Headquarters, LOGCAP support would be the only means of accomplishing the theater maintenance mission. The management efforts of the RMMC Commodity Maintenance Managers would be the driving force in the RSS' ability to improve readiness to the highest Operational Readiness (OR) rates in the history of operations in Bosnia.

MEDICAL SUPPORT:

After the Commander's Guidance, mission analysis and reconnaissance notes from the SPO, a medical troop to task list was developed. The medical requirement for level II was heavier on primary care providers and evacuation assets than the previous unit. Each Maneuver Squadron had a responsibility to support two or more base camps. However, MTOE of

maneuver squadrons has only one PA authorized and one doctor required. One primary care provider per base camp would not be sufficient to support the manpower on hand. Medical Troop, the level II medical provider, would be required to augment and reinforce the maneuver squadrons with two additional health care providers. This would bring the total of health care providers up to two per base camp. The Medical Troop also augmented each Squadron with a Mobile Treatment Team. In essence, each base camp had the equivalent of a full Squadron Aid Station.¹²

The Medical Troop deployed with all 12 of its organic ambulances and enlarged each base camp with a ground evacuation team two FLA and four medics. Medical Troop deployed with approximately 84 soldiers. This was more than enough medical support to accomplish the missions, but was appropriate for surge operations. Again, because of poor planning, the theater experienced medical support redundancy in several areas. Medical Task Force deployed with a robust Medical Supply Section. Medical Troop's Regimental Medical Supply Section (RMSS) was definitely a duplication of mission. This asset should have stayed behind. The Regimental Supply Officer should have been attached to the RMMC to perform the mission of the theater medical commodity manager. Another planning oversight involved deploying all of RSS ground medical evacuation assets. Forces prior to SFOR II were heavy. The Battalion Aid Stations had only tracks (M113) for Evacuation and the Medical Company had half wheels and tracks.¹³

CONCLUSIONS:

As the world moves toward global and collective security operations, peacekeeping operations will continue to be the preferred means of the international community (The United Nations) for decreasing violence, destruction, and mass murder in failed states. As a major player in the United Nations and the world's strongest super power, the United States will continue to shoulder a large portion of the world's peacekeeping efforts.¹⁴ The cost at some point will drive U.S. involvement. In an OOTW environment, war will not change for the warfighter. The warfighter will still have to be prepared to fight the full spectrum of war. However, the requirements and resources have changed. The army is now forced to realize that the old way of operating is not adaptable to the new environment. The way logisticians provide logistics will experience the biggest change. LOGCAP has the capability to provide the full spectrum of logistics support. A lot of tactical leaders prefer LOGCAP to traditional

logistics. The use of LOGCAP has the potential to eliminate the normal big muscle movement required of military logicians. Presently, LOGCAP is the logistics of choice because of the freedom and capabilities it provides the tactical commander.

Logistic will continue to dominate the OOTW environment. Commanders at all levels of command will have to become knowledgeable with the planning, operational, and administrative requirements of LOGCAP. U. S. Europe is using LOGCAP to provide a range of logistics support. What are the criteria to determine the best method of support (LOGCAP versa military logistics)? The contract increases and cost overrun of millions in support of Bosnia is evidence of the U.S. poor management of this outstanding resource. Presently, logistic reports from Kosovo indicate that LOGCAP remains a blank check for logistic spending.

While the LOGCAP cost overrun is in the millions, waste in the area of materiel management is worst. Materiel Management for Bosnia and Kosovo is performed from Europe. This is the worst example of material management ever observed. If the RSS had not had the ability (organic RMMC) to manage the assets shipped to the theater of Bosnia, they could not have improved readiness and material accountability. The Weekly Updates provides ever detail of the automation and materiel management challenges experienced during the rotation. The administrative management of the retrograde from both Bosnia and Kosovo is so poorly managed; it is impossible to estimate the cost.

Word Count = 6419

ENDNOTES

¹ General Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (Letter Report, 02/11/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-63), 5

² Ibid.

³ Darrell W. Aubrey, "concept Of Support" Briefing Slides in Support of Joint Endeavor, Ft Polk LA, RSS 2nd

⁴ Thomas Keegan<KEEGANT@LEAVENWORTH.ARMY.MIL> "Something to digest" electronic message to <Willie C Jordan@earthlink.net> 30 January 2001

⁵ Ibid P.3

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Willie C. Jordan<SMTP:RSS-CDR@flyaway.lsenet2.readadp.com>"RE: Weekly Update: Week ending 5 Dec 97" electronic mail message to Jones Anthony{JonesA@HANRSC.102SIGBN.ARMY.MIL}, 09 December, 1997.

⁹ Department of the Army Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) army Material Command Pamphlet 700-30 (Alexander, VA, U. S. Department of the Army, 31 January 2000

¹⁰ Marilyn Harris, LOGCAP: The Nation's Premier Contingency Contracting Program for Force XXI, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 22 June 2000), 2.

¹¹ General Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (Letter Report, 02/11/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-63), 7.

¹² Philip SheridanHserarddoc@aol.com "SFOR II Medical" electronic mail message to Willie C. Jordanicwillie@earthlink.net. 6 February 2001

¹³ Ibid.P2

¹⁴ William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Political and Lessons of the 1919s," in UN peacekeeping, American Policy, and The Uncivil Wars of The 1990s, 1st ed. New York: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996.

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